Jurisprudential legerdemain : damages for gratuitous services and attendant care by Mendelson, Danuta
Deakin Research Online 
Deakin University’s institutional research repository 
DDeakin Research Online  
Research Online  
This is the authors final peer reviewed version of the item 
published as: 
 
 
 
 
Mendelson, Danuta 2005, Jurisprudential legerdemain: damages for gratuitous services 
and attendant care, Journal of law and medicine, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 402-412. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright : 2005, Thomson Legal & Regulatory Ltd. 
 
 
     
 1 
 
Legal issues 
Editor: Danuta Mendelson MA, PhD, LLM 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin University 
JURISPRUDENTIAL LEGERDEMAIN: DAMAGES FOR GRATUITOUS 
SERVICES AND ATTENDANT CARE∗ 
The head of damages for gratuitous services and attendant care is a curious legal institution, often 
referred to as the Griffiths v Kerkemeyer head of damages. In Australia, under this head of damages, a 
wrongfully injured claimant can obtain compensation for the voluntary work of third parties 
(including the tortfeasor) who attend to the needs created by the injury. However, once the court 
calculates the monetary value of these gratuitous services and awards them, the claimant is under no 
legal obligation to reimburse the third party carers for their services.1  
 In the past decade, damages for gratuitous care (or loss thereof) have comprised a substantial part 
of the quantum of damages, particularly, but not exclusively, in medical negligence cases. In 2001 in 
Simpson v Diamond [2001] NSWSC 925,2 the case that provided the most immediate impetus for the 
torts reform of 2002-2003, the trial judge, Whealy J, awarded total damages of $A14,202,042 to 
Calandre Simpson, who was born in 1979 and suffered cerebral palsy at birth as a result of admitted 
negligence of the attending medical practitioner. The quantum of damages included $119,730 in 
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages for the care provided to Calandre by her mother in the past, and 
$25,000 for the mother’s care in the future. The Court of Appeal, in Diamond v Simpson (No 1) 
[2003] NSWCA 67 at [259], reduced the original quantum of damages to $10,998,692. While 
damages for past gratuitous care were not challenged, the Court of Appeal reduced damages for future 
care to $10,000 on the basis that once the professionals took over, Calandre’s need for services 
provided by her mother would diminish. The Court of Appeal also disallowed (at [210]) Whealy J’s 
holding that: 
The Spastic Centre’s unpaid invoices are recoverable as gratuitous services ... [they] fall on the side of 
the line more closely proximate to services provided by friends, relatives and members of the 
community generally.  
The Court of Appeal determined that an extension of the doctrine to therapeutic services provided 
free of charge by a charitable organisation was an error of law, and observed (at [232]): “Griffiths v 
Kerkemeyer claims are anomalous and exceptional and courts should be reluctant to extend the 
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer approach to new categories of claims.” However, the Court of Appeal’s 
characterisation of the gratuitous care claims as “anomalous and exceptional” does not reflect the 
reality. They are now statutorily entrenched in all but one jurisdiction, and constitute a routine 
element of every personal injury claim. For instance, in Woolworths Ltd v Lawlor [2004] NSWCA 
209, damages of $126,453.60 (out of the total of $219,536.60) were awarded for past and future 
domestic assistance provided to the plaintiff by her retired husband, despite the plaintiff’s 
continuation in her employment.3  
                                                          
∗ The author wishes to thank Professor Harold Luntz for his invaluable comments and guidance, which have helped to make 
this Column a more accurate reflection of the law of gratuitous damages. 
1 Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354 at 372.  
2 For a detailed analysis of the case and damages awarded, see Luntz H, “Damages in Medical Litigation in New South Wales” 
(2005) 12 JLM 280. 
3 Damages were awarded for past gratuitous services for 15 hours per week for the eight weeks immediately after the accident, 
nine hours per week for the next 94 weeks until the date of trial; for the future, the court allowed nine hours per week for a 
further two years and then seven hours per week for 24 years: Woolworths Ltd v Lawlor [2004] NSWCA 209 at [16]. See also 
Kavanagh v Akhtar (1998) 45 NSWLR 588, in which damages for gratuitous care were assessed at $90,000 out of $233,191.10. 
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 In October 2002, the Review of the Law of Negligence Report (the Ipp Report),4 which become a 
foundation document for partial codification of the law of negligence and the law of damages, 
recommended5 that statutory thresholds be imposed for recovery of Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages, 
and that the measure of damages be linked to average weekly earnings. It is therefore apposite to 
examine the jurisprudential basis and application of this species of compensatory damages.  
Historical note 
The concept of damages at common law has a long history. In early medieval England, damages were 
essentially meant to be an inducement to the wronged party to forgo the right to take revenge. In the 
later medieval period, perhaps by analogy with the sale of church indulgences, the courts would 
award damages “for the benefit of the wrongdoer’s soul rather than of the victim’s pocket”, on the 
basis that “the conscience of the wrongdoer must be purged by making restitution”.6 Eventually, in 
the first part of the 19th century, the judiciary crystallised the concept of compensatory damages in 
terms of putting the claimant into as good a position as if no wrong had occurred, measured by the 
loss he or she had suffered.7 Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co [1880] 5 AC 25 
observed (at 39) that an award of a lump sum: 
it is believed, so far as money can, will put the injured person in the same position as he or she would 
have been in if the wrong had not been committed.  
This notion of the purpose of compensatory damages has been interpreted to mean that, in an action 
for damages for personal injuries, apart from general damages,8 plaintiffs could recover damages only 
where their disabilities had been or may be productive of financial loss in relation to loss of earning 
capacity.9 For Australia, the rule was articulated in 1956, when in Blundell v Musgrave (1956) 96 
CLR 73 the High Court had to determine whether the tortfeasor should be liable for hospital and 
ambulance expenses stemming from the accident. The expenses had been charged by the employer 
(the Navy Department of the Commonwealth) to the injured claimant’s pay account, although the 
employer had a statutory discretion to waive them. The High Court held that the costs or value of the 
services in an action for damages for personal injuries could not be recovered unless the claimant 
could establish there was, or would be, a legal obligation to pay or refund them.10  
 In Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491, Windeyer J discussed the need-based concept of 
compensation when he divided damages arising from personal injury into three categories (at 505): 
Broadly speaking there are, it seems to me, three ways in which a personal injury can give rise to 
damage: First, it may destroy or diminish, permanently or for a time, an existing capacity, mental or 
physical: Secondly, it may create needs that would not otherwise exist: Thirdly, it may produce 
physical pain and suffering. 
The case involved Mr Teubner, the plaintiff, who while on an assignment from his newspaper to 
photograph devastation caused by a violent storm in Adelaide on 12 May 1960, was crossing the road 
at around 11pm when he was hit by the defendant’s car on his left-hand side. Mr Teubner suffered 
4 The Review of the Law of Negligence Report was written by an expert panel of eminent persons comprising the Hon Justice 
David Ipp (Chair), Professor Peter Cane, Dr Don Sheldon and Mr Ian Macintosh. The Panel was created on 2 July 2002 by the 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments to examine and review the law of negligence and its interaction with the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The Second Report, released on 2 October 2002, includes the First Report (released on  
2 September 2002), and is available at http://www.revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/reports.asp viewed 9 March 2005. 
5  The Ipp Report, n 4, Recommendation 51. 
6 Williams G, ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ (1951) 137 Current Legal Problems 143.  
7 Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 at 855.  
8  The term “general damages” has different meanings in different contexts. Frequently, it refers to compensation for past and 
future “pain and suffering”, involving both physical pain as well as any psychiatric condition caused by the injury or emotional 
distress consequent upon the knowledge that the injury has caused a disability or disfigurement, and limitations imposed by the 
disability on future enjoyment of life.  
9 Graham v Baker (1961) 106 CLR 340 at 347. In Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 at 166, Gibbs CJ adopted the 
Graham v Barker principle, stating: “In my opinion, in cases of this kind … the plaintiff is entitled to damages only to the 
extent that the need thus created is or may be productive of financial loss.” Gibbs CJ, however, was in the minority on this 
point. 
10  The full court agreed on this principle. McTiernan, Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ in a joint judgment found on the facts of 
the case that the legal obligation existed, whereas Dixon CJ and Fullagar J found that it did not.  
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very serious injuries requiring constant nursing attention (at 504).11 Windeyer J described the kinds of 
needs created by the injury thus (at 506):  
In most cases the most obvious of such needs are the cost of past and future medical and nursing 
attention, and of special equipment, crutches, a wheel chair and such like. But the list is not closed. 
Any requirement which arises as a consequence, and a not too remote consequence, of the injury, can I 
think be considered.  
The court in Teubner v Humble assumed that, in accordance with the Blundell v Musgrave principle, 
the plaintiff would only be compensated for needs giving rise to financial loss, which but for the 
injury would not be incurred. This principle of calculating damages for services on the basis of past 
and future financial loss was jettisoned in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, in which the 
plaintiff had been rendered a quadriplegic by the defendant’s negligence. In issue was the question 
whether damages, including an amount for past and future nursing and other services provided 
gratuitously by the plaintiff’s fiancée and family, were recoverable. The court reconceptualised the 
notion of compensation by adopting Windeyer J’s idea that plaintiffs can recover damages for loss as 
manifested by the needs created by the wrongful injury, but extended it to cover a need for services 
provided on voluntary basis. 
 The concept of injured persons being paid because as a result of the accident, or for some other 
reason, they have certain financial needs is common to insurance law, statutory benefits systems and 
no-fault compensation schemes. In the private law context, the adoption of the concept of 
compensation based on the plaintiff’s loss, as represented by her or his need,12 provided a rationale 
for creating a new category of compensation for gratuitous care and attendance by relatives and 
friends.13 However, since it was really the third parties who suffered the loss through provision of the 
gratuitous services, but who, as a general rule,14 had no right to sue the claimant’s injurer, it was 
unclear how to apply the new rule.  
 At the time, two decisions of the English Court of Appeal adopted different approaches to the 
issue of awarding gratuitous damages. One was Cunningham v Harrison [1973] QB 942, in which the 
Court of Appeal held that the injured husband was entitled to claim compensation for his wife’s 
voluntary care and services, but he was to hold the money on trust to pay them over to her.  
Lord Denning MR (at 952) stated: 
It seems to me that when a husband is grievously injured – and is entitled to damages – then it is only 
right and just that, if his wife renders services to him, instead of a nurse, he should recover 
compensation for the value of the services that his wife has rendered. It should not be necessary to 
draw up a legal agreement for them. On recovering such an amount, the husband should hold it on trust 
for her and pay it over to her. She cannot herself sue the wrongdoer … but she has rendered services 
necessitated by the wrong-doing, and should be compensated for it. If she had given up paid work to 
look after him, he would clearly have been entitled to recover on her behalfbecause the family income 
would have dropped by so much. 
A day after the Cunningham decision, a differently constituted Court of Appeal handed down the 
judgment in Donnelly v Joyce [1974] QB 454. This case involved a child, Christopher Stefan 
Donnelly, who sustained injuries to his right leg in a road accident caused by the defendant’s 
negligence. He was in hospital for three months. Afterwards, Christopher’s mother gave up her paid part-
time job for two years in order to attend to his needs. These included taking Christopher to the hospital daily 
for two months, as well as special daily bathing and dressing of the injured leg. Although  Christopher was 
under no obligation to repay his mother for her services, the child claimed damages for the mother’s 
                                                          
11  The injuries included partial paralysis, amputation of his left leg, as well as cognitive impairment. In 1961, he became an 
inmate of the Home for Incurables at Fullarton, Adelaide. 
12 Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 at 178.  
13  The courts awarded damages for gratuitous services by third parties long before the articulation of the doctrine. For 
example, in Roach v Yates [1938] 1 KB 256 damages were awarded loss of wages foregone by the wife and sister-in-law of the 
injured plaintiff (they had to give up their paid employment to look after him). 
14  At the time, husbands, but not wives, could sue in certain cases for loss of consortium or loss of services, and some family 
members could recover damages for nervous shock: see Hambrook v Stokes Bros [1925] 1 KB 141.  
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loss of earnings for six months. In his analysis of damages for voluntary care, Megaw LJ concluded 
(at 462):  
The question from what source the plaintiff’s needs have been met, the question who has paid the 
money or given the services, the question whether or not the plaintiff is or is not under a legal or moral 
liability to repay, are, so far as the defendant and his liability are concerned, all irrelevant… 
 Hence it does not matter, so far as the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff is concerned, whether 
the needs have been supplied by the plaintiff out of his own pocket or by a charitable contribution to 
him from some other person whom we shall call the “provider”; it does not matter, for that purpose, 
whether the plaintiff has a legal liability, absolute or conditional, to repay to the provider what he has 
received, because of the general law or of some private agreement between himself and the provider; it 
does not matter whether he has a moral obligation, however ascertained or defined, so to do.  
In Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161, the three Justices constituting the Bench, Gibbs CJ, 
Stephen and Mason JJ, followed the decision in Donnelly v Joyce [1974] QB 454, and held the 
plaintiff, whose physical condition – attributable to the accident – created a reasonable need for 
services, was entitled to recover the fair and reasonable cost of these services provided by a relative or 
friend, and “that the question whether the plaintiff is under a legal liability, or a moral obligation, to 
pay for the services is quite irrelevant” (at 163).15 
 In Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 the severely injured plaintiff was cared for at home 
by his wife who, in 1985, gave up her employment as a nurse’s aide to attend to her husband on a 
virtually full-time basis. The wife was then earning about $15,000 net per year. In the husband’s 
action for damages in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, Cox J assessed the value the wife’s gratuitous 
services at $277 per week (her former net wages less travelling expenses). The Full Court (Green CJ, 
Wright and Crawford JJ) upheld the trial judge’s assessment; however, in the High Court, Mason CJ 
and Toohey and McHugh JJ held (at 331): 
[T]he wages forgone by a care provider are not an appropriate criterion for determining the value of 
services provided gratuitously to an injured person. As a general rule, the market cost or value of those 
services is the fair and reasonable value of such services.16  
The doctrine was further developed in Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354 where, as a result of the 
accident, the plaintiff suffered injuries to her back which left her with a permanent disability. Her 
need for help in performing everyday tasks was voluntarily provided by her mother, mother-in-law, 
neighbours and her tortfeasor-husband. The High Court decided that future voluntary services 
provided by her husband-tortfeasor and valued at $61,500 were compensable because “[f]rom the 
plaintiff’s point of view, the identity of the person who fulfils the need caused by the tort matters not” 
(at 380).  
 At common law, the quantum of damages for past and future gratuitous care is calculated by the 
value of services required, and is not measured by the actual cost to the plaintiff (which, by definition, 
is nil), but by reference to the market value of like services.17 Moreover, in Grincelis v House (2000) 
210 CLR 321 the majority of the High Court determined that when assessing damages for past 
gratuitous services, the court should add interest at commercial rates “to take account of inflation”. In 
separate dissenting judgments, Kirby and Callinan JJ pointed out the incongruity and artificiality of 
this approach. Kirby J wrote (at [29]-[30]):  
[G]iven that the very essence of the entitlement is that the services in question have been provided 
gratuitously; that the services are not usually donated for reasons of profit-making; that the amount 
recovered by the plaintiff is not legally repayable to those who provided the services; and that nobody 
has actually been out of pocket in money terms at all… To add interest upon a sum of money so 
derived takes logic almost to snapping point. It requires an extension of presuppositions that oblige a 
court, asked to adopt this course, to pause and ask where logic, in the form of “basic legal principles”, 
has taken the law.  
15 See also Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 at 262; Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 at 331-333, 338.  
16 The approximate market rate applicable at the time was $549 per week (at 339). 
17  Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327. 
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 Both the conceptual basis and the practical operation of the doctrine of damages for gratuitous 
care have been criticised. The year after the decision in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, the Scottish Law 
Commission in its report on Damages for Personal Injuries,18 observed in relation to Megaw LJ’s 
statements in Donnelly v Joyce:  
In cases where services have been rendered gratuitously to an injured person, it is artificial to regard 
that person as having suffered a net loss in the events which happened. The loss is in fact sustained by 
the person rendering the services, a point vividly illustrated in cases where he has lost earnings in the 
course of rendering those services. We suggest, therefore, that it is wrong in principle, in cases where 
services have been rendered gratuitously by another to an injured person, to regard the latter as having 
in fact suffered a net loss. 
In 1986 Tasmania abolished Griffiths v Kerkemeyer awards for gratuitous services by enacting the 
Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act 1986 (Tas), s 5, which states:  
An award of damages that relates to personal injury of a person shall not include compensation for the 
value of services of a domestic nature or services relating to nursing and attendance –  
(a) which have been or are to be provided by another person to the person in whose favour the award 
is made; and  
(b) for which the person in whose favour the award is made has not paid or is not liable to pay. 
In relation to Tasmania, however, Professor Harold Luntz,19 has drawn attention to the fact that, at the 
time, nearly all claims in Tasmania would have concerned injuries caused by motor accidents. Since 
the Tasmanian Motor Accidents Insurance Board was providing for these needs under the no-fault 
scheme, Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages could be safely abolished.  
 In England, the House of Lords disapproved of Donnelly v Joyce in Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 
350, a case which involved a similar claim to that in Kars, whereby gratuitous services were provided 
to the claimant by her tortfeasor-partner.20 Lord Bridge of Harwich, who delivered the leading 
judgment in Hunt, preferred (at 361) the reasoning of Lord Denning in Cunningham v Harrison to 
that of Megaw LJ in Donnelly v Joyce: 
With respect, I do not find this reasoning convincing. I accept that the basis of a plaintiff’s claim for 
damages may consist in his need for services but I cannot accept that the question from what source 
that need has been met is irrelevant. If an injured plaintiff is treated in hospital as a private patient he is 
entitled to recover the cost of that treatment. But if he receives free treatment under the National Health 
Service, his need has been met without cost to him and he cannot claim the cost of the treatment from 
the tortfeasor. So it cannot, I think, be right to say that in all cases the plaintiff’s loss is “ for the 
purpose of damages ... the proper and reasonable cost of supplying [his] needs.”  
The House of Lords determined that injured plaintiffs who recover damages for gratuitous services 
should hold them on trust for the voluntary carer. Furthermore, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover 
damages in respect of those services rendered by the defendant-tortfeasor herself or himself. This is 
because, once there is a duty to hold the money in trust for the voluntary carer, it makes no sense to 
require the tortfeasor to pay to the plaintiff a sum of money in respect of the services that the 
tortfeasor has rendered, and which the plaintiff must then repay to the tortfeasor.  
 In Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354 at 372, Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ expressly 
rejected the Hunt v Severs approach, and reaffirmed the doctrine in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer formulated 
by Stephen J,21 for the following reason:  
This conclusion [that the claimant has no moral or legal obligation to reimburse altruistic carers for 
their services] is now too deeply entrenched in this part of the law in Australia for this Court to reopen 
18 Scottish Law Commission, Damages for Personal Injuries: 1. Admissibility of Claims for Services and 2. Admissible 
Deductions, Report No 51 (1978) at [22].  
19 Personal communication, 28 March 2005. 
20  Plaintiff’s damages included an award of £17,000 for past gratuitous services rendered by the defendant and £60,000 for 
future voluntary care.  
21  “[T]he plaintiff should, I think, be regarded as beneficially entitled to the judgment he obtains without question of the 
imposition of any trust in respect of some part of his damages in favour of one who has rendered, or may in the future render, 
gratuitous services to him”: Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 139 CLR 161 at 177.  
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it. It is an accepted principle in Australia that the damages for past and future gratuitous services 
constitute a sum designed to provide for the injured plaintiff’s established needs. That sum may be 
calculated by reference to what the provider does and even what the commercial costs of doing it 
would entail. But the focus is upon the plaintiff’s needs. The plaintiff might, or might not, reimburse 
the provider. According to the repeated authority of this Court, contractual or other legal liability apart, 
whether the plaintiff actually reimburses the provider is entirely a matter between the injured plaintiff 
and the provider.  
Subsequently, in Grincelis v House (2000) 201 CLR 321,22 Kirby J changed his mind on the 
jurisprudential merits of the Griffiths v Kerkemeyer doctrine, stating (in dissent at [25]):  
Having, in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer, embraced the principle that an injured plaintiff is entitled to recover 
damages for his or her needs met by the provision of gratuitous services by family or friends, this Court 
was set upon a path that has repeatedly demonstrated the “anomalies”, “artificiality” and even 
“absurdities” of the “novel legal doctrine” which it adopted in substitution for its own earlier stated 
opinion.23  
The Grincelis v House majority (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), however, 
while noting “judicial dissatisfaction with the principle adopted in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer”, quoted 
Kirby J’s own words in Kars v Kars back and reiterated (at [19]):  
What was decided in Griffiths v Kerkemeyer is “too deeply entrenched in this part of the law in 
Australia for this Court to reopen it”. 
Indemnity insurance 
One of the major reasons for the generous approach to the Griffiths v Kerkemeyer awards is the 
inconsistency between the articulated legal fiction that damages are paid out of the defendant’s 
pocket, and an unarticulated cognisance of the fact that in great majority of cases damages are paid by 
the insurer.24 In Kars v Kars (1996) 187 CLR 354, the High Court suggested (at 381-382) that “a 
review of the relevance of insurance to the development of the common law liability in tort may 
indeed be timely”,25 but never seriously followed it up. When in Dimond v Lovell (decided in May 
2000 and reported at [2002] 1 AC 384) the House of Lords again criticised Megaw LJ’s judgment in 
Donnelly v Joyce, Lord Hoffmann pointed out (at 399) that the assumption 
that damages will be paid by “the wrongdoer” out of his own pocket is not in accordance with reality. 
The truth is that virtually all compensation is paid directly out of public or insurance funds and that 
through these channels the burden of compensation is spread across the whole community through an 
intricate series of economic links. Often, therefore, the sources of “third party benefits” will not in 
reality be third parties at all. Their cost will also be borne by the community through taxation or 
increased prices for goods and services.  
The realisation that the cost of damages awarded in tort cases is borne by the whole community was 
the core element of the Australian torts reform initiative.26 
Tort reform 
In enacting reforms to damages for gratuitous services, the Commonwealth27 New South Wales,28 
Victoria,29 the Northern Territory30 and, partly, Queensland31 followed the Ipp Report’s 
22 See also Callinan J (in dissent) in the same case at [45]-[58].  
23  His Honour was referring to Blundell v Musgrave (1956) 96 CLR 73.  
24 For example, in Hunt v Severs [1994] 2 AC 350, Lord Bridge declared (at 462): “At common law, the circumstance that a 
defendant is contractually indemnified by a third party against a particular legal liability can have no relevance whatsoever to 
the measure of that liability.”  
25 Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ. For a discussion of this issue see Mendelson D, “Plaintiffs’ Needs, Insured 
Defendants and Assessment of Damages” (1997) 4 JLM 307.  
26 Ipp Report, n 4, at [3.4] and [3.5]; see also New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 23 October 2002, p 22. See 
also Luntz H, “The Collateral Source Rule Thirty Years On” in P Cane and J Stapleton (eds), The Law of Obligations: Essays 
in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) p 377. 
27  Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth), s 87W. 
28  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15.  
29  Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IA. Victoria also has special statutory heads of damages for loss of gratuitous care (s 19A) and 
loss of capacity to provide care for others (s 28ID).  
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es are necessary”;  or “there is (or was) a reasonable need for the services to 
he services arose solely out of the injury in relation to which damages are 
 provided, or are to be provided for less than six hours per week, and for less 
ges in respect of gratuitous services is ambiguous. Under the Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA
                                                                                                                                                                   
Recommendation 51.32 The Ipp guidelines were essentially based on a model, which was originally 
developed in the context of motor accident claims, first through amendments to the Motor Vehicles 
(Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW), then continued in the Motor Accidents Act 1988 (NSW) 
and the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW).33 Western Australia34 and South 
Australia35 developed their own codes; however, these do not differ greatly from the majority’s 
approach. In Tasmania awards for gratuitous services have been abolished (see above). While the 
Australian Capital Territory is governed by common law in relation to awards of damages for 
gratuitous care provided to the plaintiff, by virtue of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 
100(2)(d), the plaintiff can recover damages for loss of capacity to perform domestic gratuitous 
services that he or she previously rendered, or might have been reasonably expected
o rs.36  
 The Commonwealth, New South Wales, Victoria, Northe
that damages for gratuitous services37 are not to be awarded:  
• unless “the servic 38
be provided”;39 and 
• unless the need for t
awarded;40 and 
• if the services are
than 6 months.41  
As a general rule, under the Commonwealth trade practices legislation, in New South Wales, 
Victoria, the Northern Territory and Western Australia, damages for gratuitous services are subject to 
a maximum of 40 hours a week and a maximum hourly rate of 1/40th of average weekly earnings in 
the relevant jurisdiction.42 Western Australia excludes any services that would have been provided in 
any event, and has a monetary threshold of $5,000 (adjusted on annual inflation basis) with 
calculation of damages over the monetary threshold tied to weekly earnings.43 The provision 
governing dama
), s 58 (1):  
 
30  Personal Injuries Act 2003 (NT), ss 18, 23.  
31 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59.  
32  Ipp Report, n 4.  
33  Professor Harold Luntz, personal communication, 28 March 2005. 
34  Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 12, 13.  
35  Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 58.  
36 At common law, this head of damages was first recognised by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sullivan v Gordon 
(1999) 47 NSWLR 319, which determined that common law damages for loss of capacity to care for others were recoverable. 
See also Weinert v Schmidt (2002) 84 SASR 307, and CSR Ltd v Thompson [2003] NSWCA 329 which is at present under 
appeal to the High Court on this point.  
37  In some jurisdictions gratuitous services are defined as “attendant care services”, which refer to “(a) services of a domestic 
nature; (b) services relating to nursing; (c) services that aim to alleviate the consequences of an injury.” See eg the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(1).  
38  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(1)(a). Section 59(4) also provides that “In assessing damages for gratuitous services, a 
court must take into account – (a) any offsetting benefit the service provider obtains through providing the services; and  
(b) periods for which the injured person has not required or is not likely to require the services because the injured person has 
been or is likely to be cared for in a hospital or other institution.” 
39  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(2)(a); Personal Injuries Act 2003 (NT), s 23(1)(a); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic),  
s 28IA(1)(a); Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth), s 87W(2)(a).  
40  Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(1)(b); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(2)(b); Personal Injuries Act 2003 (NT), 
s 23(1)(b); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IA(1)(b); Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 
(Cth), s 87W(2)(b).  
41 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 59(1)(c); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 15(2)(c); Personal Injuries Act 2003 (NT), 
s 23(2); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IA(2); Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth), 
s 87W(2)(d) and (e). 
42 Trade Practices Amendment (Personal Injuries and Death) Act (No 2) 2004 (Cth), s 87W(3); Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), s 15(4); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 28IB; Personal Injuries Act 2003 (NT), s 23; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), 
ss 12(5), (6) and (7). 
43 Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 12(3), 13(1). 
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ense of gratuitous services except services of a parent, spouse or child of 
red, or to be voluntarily incurred, by a person rendering gratuitous services to the 
arnings is set for gratuitous 
 excess of this limit.45  
words and phrases as well as legal 
an
9, the court was invited to interpret 
s 15
awarded to a claimant for gratuitous attendant care services unless the court is 
9]) the operation of s 15(2)(b) if the word “substantially” were substituted for the 
wor
agraph, a plaintiff would 
                                                          
[D]amages are not to be awarded  
(a) to allow for the recomp
the injured person; or  
(b) to allow for the reimbursement of expenses, other than reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, 
voluntarily incur
injured person.  
This suggests that persons other that “a parent, spouse or child” can only recover “reasonable out-of-
pocket expenses”, though the legislation does not provide any thresholds or limits upon such 
expenses. In relation to “a parent, spouse or child of the injured person”, there is no mention of out-
of-pocket expenses; however, the cap of four times average weekly e
service,44 though the court may award damages in
Interpretation of statutory provisions 
Close reading of the very complex damages provisions will, in due course, undoubtedly generate 
many challenges relating to the interpretation of particular 
st dards governing the new statutory compensation regimes.  
 For example, in Woolworths Ltd v Lawlor [2004] NSWCA 20
(2)(b) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), which provides: 
No damages may be 
satisfied that: …  
(b) the need has arisen (or arose) solely because of the injury to which the damages relate. 
Using a hypothetical example of a claimant with a pre-existing condition who required assistance of 
five hours per week before the accident, and 15 hours of post-accident gratuitous care, Beazley JA 
(Hodgson and Tobias JJA concurring), interpreted s 15(2)(b) as allowing for an award of 10 hours for 
gratuitous attendant care services because the need for those 10 hours had arisen “solely because of 
the injury to which the damages relate” (at [28]).46 In coming to this conclusion, Beazley JA, having 
noted that that such construction did “not do any violence to the express words of the section”, 
discussed (at [2
d “solely”:  
[T]hen the section would have directed the Court to make an assessment whether the need for the 
services arose substantially or mainly because of the injury. If the need arose substantially because of 
the injury a plaintiff would be entitled to an award notwithstanding that portion of the need was 
attributable to some other cause. So in the example given in the previous par
be entitled to an award for 15 hours of attendant services, not 10.  
Her Honour effectively adopted the approach of Deane and Dowson JJ in Van Gervan v Fenton 
(1992) 175 CLR 327 at 350, who in their dissenting judgment canvassed the argument that, in 
assessing the value of gratuitous services, “it is proper to have regard to the fact that where the 
services are provided by gratuitous carers in their own home, to the extent that they were providing 
some domestic services before the plaintiff suffered the injury, the need for which the plaintiff should 
be compensated relates only to those services that were not previously provided by the carer.” Indeed, 
the provision directs the court to make a comparison between the post-accident circumstances and the 
pre-accident situation. The causes for such care may vary. They could include a claimant’s innate lack 
of physical dexterity, lack of interest in domestic matters, laziness or, as in Woolworths Ltd v Lawlor, 
the fact that the claimant continued in full-time employment after her husband had retired from work. 
Unless the court inquires why, what kind of, and for how long gratuitous services were provided to 
44  Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 58(2). 
45 Under the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 58(3), if the court is satisfied that: “(a) the gratuitous services are reasonably 
required by the injured person; and (b) it would be necessary, if the services were not provided gratuitously by a parent, spouse 
or child of the injured person to engage another person to provide the services for remuneration.” In that event, the damages 
awarded are not to reflect a rate of remuneration for the person providing the services in excess of State average weekly 
earnings.  
46 Somewhat puzzlingly, Beazley JA added: “This construction derives directly from the definition of ‘injury’ which includes 
‘impairment of a person's physical or mental condition’.”  
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sholds merely measure its 
In s care and compensation for pure 
 J in Gifford v Strang Patrick 
Stev
 conduct 
the relatives may have an 
ast gratuitous services by her husband, Mr Masri, and $2,726,850 for future care and 
an
                                                          
the claimant before the accident, and then clearly delineates them in pre- and post-accident terms, the 
court will be effectively substituting the adverb “substantially” for “solely” when calculating damages 
for gratuitous care. It also would be helpful to develop a definition of “need” for the purposes of 
gratuitous services or devise a legal test for assessing it. Statutory thre
“quantity” in terms of hours, to be translated into hourly or weekly rates.  
terface between damages for gratuitou
psychiatric injury (pure mental harm) 
Finally, the major policy consideration underlying the concept of compensation for gratuitous care is 
the acknowledgment – in a rather peculiar and indirect way – of loss, sometimes hardship, 
experienced by family members and friends who deal on a day-to-day basis with the demands of 
caring for someone who has suffered an injury. When this head of damages was created in the 1970s, 
the law, with some notable statutory exceptions,47 was still virtually in total denial of the fact that an 
injury to, or death of, a person can have devastating psychological consequences for those with whom 
he or she was in a loving relationship. Since then, the High Court in Tame v New South Wales; 
Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317,48 followed by Gifford v Strang Patrick 
Stevedoring Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 33, enunciated that the determining factor of recovery for “pure 
mental harm” is reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury.49 Hence, defendants’ liability for 
“pure mental harm”50 should be “the closeness and affection of the relationship” between the person 
injured or killed by the defendant and her or his close relatives. McHugh
edoring Pty Ltd (at [51]) expressed the rule in the following terms:  
The test is, would a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, who knew or ought to know of that 
particular relationship, consider that the third party was so closely and directly affected by the
that it was reasonable to have that person in contemplation as being affected by that conduct?  
 In general, all Australian States and Territories allow recovery for pure mental harm in the form 
of a recognised psychiatric illness if the claimant is a close member of the family of a person killed, 
injured or endangered in the accident.51 This means that, once found liable, a defendant who has 
wrongfully injured or killed one person can face separate actions by several claimants arising out of 
the same wrong.52 The defendant will have to pay damages that include compensation for gratuitous 
services provided to the plaintiff by close relatives. If the gratuitous carers for whose services the 
injured person has been compensated are also close relatives who have suffered a foreseeable 
psychiatric injury as a result of the wrongful injury to the plaintiff, 
independent action in negligence for mental harm against the defendant.  
 For example, in Masri v Marinko [1998] NSWSC 467, Mrs Masri suffered catastrophic brain 
damage while undergoing an abortion. Through her next friend, she sued in negligence the medical 
practitioner who performed the abortion. She was awarded $3.7 million in damages, which included 
$317,200 for p
m agement.  
47  Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1944 (NSW), s 4; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), 
Pt VII, ss 23, 24 and 25; Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 (ACT), Pt VII, ss 23,  24 and 25; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA), ss 28 and 29; Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Act 1974 (NT), s 10.  
48  The Tame and Annetts cases were heard together. 
49 The term “mental harm” has been defined as “impairment of a person’s mental condition”: see Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW), s 27.However, both at common law and under statute, damages are not available for conditions other that “recognised 
psychiatric illness”.  
50  The action for variously called “pure psychiatric injury”, “pure nervous shock” or “pure mental harm” refers to liability for 
negligently inflicted psychiatric illness that does not arise from a physical injury to the claimant.  
51 Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 53; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 32(2)(b); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 73(2): “a close 
relationship with the victim”; Error! Reference source not found.  (ACT), s 36; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 
30(2)(b); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT), s 24(1) is to be interpreted according to common law; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5Q, reflects the common law; Queensland is governed by the common law. 
52 Under the survival of actions rule, the estate of the deceased plaintiff may proceed with a cause of action the deceased would 
have had against the defendant, if she or he had lived; and the dependants may sue the defendant under the wrongful death 
action to recover damages for the foreseeable loss they suffered that as a result of the victim’s death.  
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mmon law compensation for the need for gratuitous care, the carers may be able to 
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Mor
impressionistic. For, as 
                                                          
 Mr Masri gave up his job to look after his wife but, at the time, refused to apply to the 
administrator of his wife’s fund for payment for his services. He sued Dr Marinko for negligently 
occasioned pure psychiatric injury (nervous shock) in the form of “pathological grief”. This phrase 
sometimes used to describe an emotional reaction to bereavement, which is considered more marked 
than an uncomplicated bereavement; however neither “pathological grief” nor uncomplicated 
bereavement meet the diagnostic criteria for any diagnosable mental disorder).53  Mr Masri’s 
pathological grief did not present as a Major Depressive Disorder54 but manifested itself in an 
obsessional insistence on performing voluntary services for his injured wife. Rolfe J assessed Mr 
Masri’s damages at $455,170, comprising $93,335 for general damages including interest, $299,998 
for past wage loss including interest, and $61,837 for lost earning capacity. Although the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal55 in Marinko v Masri [1999] NSWCA 364 reduced the quantum for general 
damages and damages for past wages, it affirmed Rolfe J’s reasoning that Mr Masri’s entitlement to 
recover his loss of wages flowed from the psychiatric injury he suffered in consequence o
ndant’s tortious conduct, and as such was independent of Mrs Masri’s right to recover for he
vant loss. Handley JA (with whom Priestley JA and Sheppard AJA agreed) stated (at [32]):  
The two claims [Mrs Masri’s and Mr Masri’s] are separate and distinct, and there is no necessary 
overlap. The position would have been different if the husband had not been disabled, but gave up paid 
employment to look after th
two causes of action and two losses and I have not been persuaded that there is any double dipping or 
overlap in the two awards. 
 The question whether damages for loss of capacity to provide gratuitous care, known as Sullivan 
v Gordon damages56, are recoverable in law, will be considered by the High Court in CSR Ltd v 
Thompson.57 Should the High Court hold that they are recoverable, then if Mrs Masri also had 
children, the defendant would have to pay damages for her inability to provide gratuitous care for her 
children, and they in turn would have an independent action against the defendant for pure psychiatric 
disorder occasioned by their moth 58
who receives co
obtain statutory carers’ benefits.  
Conclusion 
The law should acknowledge that wrongful injury or death constitutes an infringement of the interest 
in unimpaired family relations. Those in a loving relationship with the injured or killed person often 
suffer intense emotional distress, which sometimes can lead to a diagnosable psychiatric disorder. In 
many instances, wrongfully inflicted injury or death of a loved person also occasions economic loss 
to his or her relatives. However, the present system of awarding plaintiffs (or their estates)59 damages 
for gratuitous care by reference to the carer’s loss but leaving it to the plaintiff (or the estate 
administrator) to determine whether or not to hand over the money to the altruistic carer is ab
eover, the assessment of damages - which tend to involve tens of thousand of dollars - is 
Windeyer J observed in Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491 at 507: 
53 Volkan V, “Typical Findings in Pathological Grief” (1970) 44 Psychiatric Quarterly 231-50; Zisook S & DeVaul R, 
“Unresolved Grief” (1985) 45 The American Journal of Psychoanalysis 370-79; Zisook S & Shuchter SR, “Time Course of 
Spousal Bereavement” (1985) 7 General Hospital Psychiatry 95-100; Engel GL, “Is Grief a Disease?” (1961) 23(1) 
Psychosomatic Medicine 18-22; Maddison D & Raphael B, “Normal Bereavenent as an Illness Requiring Care: 
Psychopharmacological Approaches” (1972) 2 Journal of Pharmacology 785-98. 
54 Bloch s & Singh BS (Eds), Foundations of Clinical Psychiatry 2nd ed Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 2001 at 178-
79; se also: DSM IV TR, Additional Conditions that may Be a Focus of Clinical Attention (Not Mental Disorders): “V62.82 
Bereavement” Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association 2000 at 740;  
 
56 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319; [1999] NSWCA 338. 
57  High Court of Australia Bulletin, No 2 (2005) (as at 24 March 2005): see http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other 
/hca/bulletin/hcab0502.html viewed 28 March 2005. 
58  Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd [2003] HCA 33; Cubbon, Cubbon & Bates v Roads and Traffic Authority 
(NSW) [2004] NSWCA 326.  
59 Subject to statutory thresholds and caps, damages for the value of voluntary services for the period between injury and death 
are generally available.  
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th average weekly wages. However, given that the 
ns 
for jettisoning the common law tort of negligence relating to personal injury, in f
o-fault insurance scheme for injured persons who are in need of long-term care and attendance.   
Danuta Mendelson 
 
                                                          
The main difficulty in assessing damages for needs created is in the impossibility of surely predicting 
the future.  
The principled approach would be to either create a discrete cause of action for voluntary carers with 
defined elements and appropriate legal standards, or to provide special statutory benefits for them at 
either commercial rates or in conformity wi
Griffiths v Kerkemeyer head of damages is now codified, it will probably take another professional 
indemnity crisis before this issue is addressed. 
 More fundamentally, once the common law of negligence has reconceptualised itself in terms of 
a need-based compensation institution, the question arises why should the community – through its 
legal system – discriminate against the carers of injured persons who have the same needs but are 
unable to prove fault? There are valid economic, equitable, compassionate and transparency reaso
avour of a national 
60n
60 Luntz H, “The Case for No-fault Accident Compensation” (1985) 15 Q Law Soc J 161; Luntz H, “Reform of the Law of 
Negligence: Wrong Questions – Wrong Answers” (2002) 25 UNSWLJ 836; Luntz H, “Guest Editorial: Medical Indemnity and 
Tort Law Reform” (2003) 10 JLM 385.  
